Brush's and Allchin's arguments are similar in that they both state that assuming science always fits neatly into our notion of the scientific method is dangerous from a historical and philosophical point of view. This is because it is apparently not always true, and it can mislead our science students, teachers, and practicing scientists. Lawson's shoehorn may be potentially problematic, but it is important to keep an open mind and consider all viewpoints on a given subject.
Allchin uses several cases to support his main point that "the error lies in trying to fit the history of science into one particular philosophical conception of science". By that he means that some of the great historical scientific examples we as science teachers often use in the classroom are not necessarily rigid examples of scientific method and hypothetico-deductive reasoning. We then as teachers turn around and insist students follow these strict guidelines in the laboratory, as all great scientists have always done. One of the most interesting points he makes is that sometimes it's more the development of new or better instruments (in this case the telescope and microscope) than it is adherence to a particular scientific philosophy that makes for important discoveries.
I very much appreciated that he used two biological examples (Harvey/Malpghi and Mendel) along with Galileo to support his main point. He mentions that sometimes even original sources need to be carefully considered as to meaning and context, and of course secondary ones must be examined for omissions, additions, and misinterpretations. I think in some ways Allchin is a bit of a nit-picker, because even if neither Harvey nor Malpghi hypothesized about capillaries, they were still discovered in the course of their experiments. To me that is what science is about, because sometimes you have an incomplete or incorrect hypothesis, and the joy of discovery often comes from unexpected and unforeseen outcomes. After all that is how both the Gram stain and antibiotics came to be known. Likewise, the use of agar to replace gelatin in the microbiology lab was hardly due to rigorous conformation to scientific method. Of course, as I sit back and read what I have typed I realize this is really the point he was trying to make, after all.
The section on Mendel was particularly intriguing, and along with the other cases Allchin effectively shoots Lawson's ideas down. To me it's okay that Mendel's work didn't neatly fit under the umbrella of hypothetico-deductive reasoning, as long as we as science educators understand that and pass it on to our students. His work was still tremendously important to the development of biology and genetics. In fact the essays I have read the past few days have made me realize that in my career I have, maybe sometimes subconsciously, tried very hard to teach science as it really was and is. I also realize I can do more to avoid the pitfalls of teaching rote science and science history gleaned from Brush's "celestial textbook writers".I also expect my students to be able to originate, structure, and carry out original research projects using the scientific method as a model. At the same time they need to understand that scientific discovery as a process is a human endeavor, with all the frailties that entails.
Bibliographic Note:
Douglas Allchin. "Lawson's Shoehorn, or Should the Philosophy of Science Be Rated 'X'?", Science & Education 12 (2003): 315-329. The author discusses Lawson's interpretations of works by Galileo and Mendel and how philosophical preconceptions can distort history and and lessons about the nature of science, especially concerning scientific method and hypothetico-deductive reasoning.
Anton Lawson, "The Generality of the Hypothetico-Deductive Method: Making Scientific Thinking Explicit", American Biology Teacher 62 (2000): 482-495
Anton Lawson, "What Does Galileo's Discovery of Jupiter's Moons Tell Us About the Process of Scientific Discovery?" Science & Education 11 (2002): 1-24.
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